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CHAPTER 23 
Administ~ation of Justice 
RICHARD H. FIELD 
Once again the focal point of concern for the administration of 
justice in Massachusetts is the continuing intolerable congestion in 
the Superior Court. The 1955 SURVEY year was in a sense discourag-
ing because the backlog of pending cases again significantly increased 
and substantially nothing of a tangible nature was done to arrest this 
trend. On the other hand, the appointment by Governor Herter of a 
Judicial Survey Commission, composed of twenty-one jurists, lawyers, 
and laymen, to make a broad study of the administration of justice in 
the courts of the Commonwealth, held out more promise for the 
future than any step taken in recent years. Not unnaturally the very 
fact that this study was being made had a dampening effect on legis-
lative proposals in the last session looking toward relief from con-
gestion. In most instances, the legislature wisely chose to refrain 
from piecemeal bites at the problem until the Commission's report 
was in. 
A. THE BUSINESS OF THE COURTS 
§23.1. The Superior Court. The following table1 demonstrates 
the increase in the backlog of pending civil cases in the Superior 
Court in the past five years: 
RICHARD H. FIELD is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. He is the co·author 
(witb Benjamin Kaplan) of Cases and Materials on Civil Procedure (1953). 
§23.1. 1 The statistics in the tables which follow have, except as otherwise in-
dicated, been taken from the Reports of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, which 
are published annually as Public Document 144. 
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§23.l ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 239 
TABLE 12 
Superior Court Business 
Year 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 
Undisposed of cases 
beginning of year 51,388 56,318 59,837 59,504 66,381 
Entries during year 30,056 31,587 33,060 33,946 32,366 
Dispositions during 
year 25,614 27,990 34,045 29,015 30,611 
Undisposed of cases 
end of year 56,328 60,043 50,445 64,027 67,416 
It will be observed that the number of cases pending at the close 
of the 1955 SURVEY year is 3389 more than the corresponding figure 
for the previous year.3 The increase would have been even greater 
but for the rule, effective for the first time this year, reducing the 
period before the dismissal of an inactive case from six years to four 
years.4 
As has been pointed out previously,1i however, the size of the back-
log of pending cases is not the true measure of congestion. The 
case that slumbers on the "Pending" docket until by lapse of time it is 
moved to the "Disposed Of" docket does not concern the litigant who 
wants a trial.6 It is only when cases take up the court's time by ap-
pearing on a pretrial or trial list that their presence is felt. The 
significant statistics are those showing how long after entry it takes 
for a case to be reached for trial in the ordinary course. This in-
formation, not collected by the Judicial Council as a part of the 
official statistics, is as follows for the more populous counties: 
2 The discrepancies in these compilations, pointed out in §27.2 0:: the 1954 SURVEY, 
still exist. For instance, the difference between the number of cases listed as pend-
ing at the end of 1954 and at the beginning of 1955 is 2273. This discrepancy comes 
almost wholly from the figures from Essex and Hampden counties, where increases of 
637 and 1639, respectively, are shown. The Essex clerk's office reports that the in-
crease in that court is an error resulting from the inadvertent counting of cases in 
one docket twice. 
3 Possibly 745, the listed difference between 1954-1955 entries and dispositions, is 
a more accurate figure. See note 2 supra. 
4 Superior Court Rule 85 (1954). Under this rule 3389 cases were dismissed in 
1954-1955 as compared to 660 in the previous year. 
51954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §27.2. 
6 The clerk of the Superior Court for Suffolk County writes: "Of the twenty-two 
thousand odd cases shown in Box 8 of my report to the Judicial Council, I estimate 
several thousand of them as being non-triable cases, which for one reason or an-
other remain undisposed of on my docket." It is fair to assume that similarly in 
other counties there are many cases technically pending which are for all practical 
purposes dead. For instance, there are in this category cases involving insurance 
companies in receivership the further prosecution of which is enjoined, cases which 
have been tried and remain pending only because of the theoretical possibility of 
a motion for costs, and the like. This makes the over-all total of pending cases 
meaningful only on a comparative basis. 
2
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TABLE 117 
Average Number of Months' Waiting Period 
for Jury Trials 
Worcester 
Middlesex 
Suffolk 
Hampden 
Norfolk 
Essex 
Salem 
Lawrence 
Newburyport 
48 
38 
28 
27 
21 
27 
30 
4 (approx.) 
§23.1 
It is plain that the Chief Justice of the Superior Court is forced to 
deploy his judicial manpower in a many-front war, and that a speed-
ing up of the jury docket in one county is likely to be accompanied 
by an increased delay in another.8 The shifting conditions during the 
year are reflected by Table IlIon the opposite page. 
Thus it appears that there was a substantial speeding up of the list 
in Suffolk County9 and a slight gain in Norfolk and Essex, but an in-
creased delay in Middlesex and Worcester during the year. Worcester 
County now owns the dubious distinction of having the longest waiting 
period of any county in the United States.1o 
7 These figures, speaking as of the end of the trial year ending June 30, 1955, and 
giving the average waiting period for the year, were furnished the writer by the 
clerks except for Hampden County. For Hampden County they are taken from 
Institute of Judicial Administration, State Courts of General Jurisdiction; Calendar 
Status Study-1955 (June 30, 1955), but since they were compiled in the spring of 
1955 they may not accurately reflect the average for the full year. In the computa-
tion of these figures cases advanced for speedy trial either by statutory mandate or 
on motion have been excluded. By way of contrast, the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration shows the following waiting periods in months for other metropolitan 
areas: Los Angeles, 13; San Francisco, 9; Baltimore, 14; Detroit, 13; Minneapolis, 
12; St. Louis, 11; Philadelphia, 10.5. 
8 The situation in the less populous counties shows sharp variations. The clerk 
in Berkshire County, for example, reports an average delay of 31 months, and the 
clerk for Franklin County an average of 15 months. Moreover, where the volume 
of litigation is small, average figures are likely to be deceptive. In Franklin County 
the average was distorted by two old land damage cases, each pending for about 
seven years, which were tried in May, 1955, just before they would have been dis-
missed under Rule 85. Actually, many other trials were well under a year after 
entry, some within four months. 
9 It is curious to note that this gain was achieved despite a reduction in the num-
ber of days of jury sessions from 1070 in 1953-1954 (when the waiting period in-
creased) to 1022 in 1954-1955. 
10 The information was furnished by the clerks of the several counties. The In-
stitute of Judicial Administration Calendar Status Study, the figures in which are 
subject to the possible infirmity referred to in note 7 supra, show for Hampden 
County an increase in average waiting period from 25 to 27 months in the past year. 
3
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§23.1 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 241 
TABLE III 
Changes in Waiting Period for Jury Trials, 1954-55 
Date of Entry of Most Recently Entered Case Tried 
in Ordinary Course During Year 
1953-54 1954-55 
Suffolk October 23, 1951 July 14, 1953 
Middlesex August 9, 1951 April 7, 1952 
Norfolk June, 1952 September, 1953 
Worcester 
At Worcester January 2, 1951 July 2, 1951 
At Fitchburg November 3, 1952 July 1, 1953 
Essex 
At Salem March 24, 1952 April 6, 1953 
At Lawrence November 1, 1950 October 27, 1952 
At Newburyport December 16, 1953 December 6, 1954 
The allocation of Superior Court justices among civil jury, non-
jury, and criminal sessions for the past year as compared to the year 
1953-1954 was as follows: 
TABLE IV 
Days in Which Superior Court Judges Sat 
1954-55 
Civil Jury 
Non-jury 
Criminal 
District Judges 
in Superior Court 
2894! 
1452! 
1272~~ 
5619! 
498 
1953-54 
2806 
1573 
1120 
5499 
413 
The most striking disclosure from these figures is the marked in-
crease in the criminal workload. The 1770Y2 trial days devoted to the 
criminal docket was an increase of 237Y2 days over 1953-1954, or over 
15 percent; and the 1953-1954 figure was itself notably higher than in 
previous years.H To handle this added volume, District Court judges 
were used in misdemeanor cases more extensively than in any year 
since 1942, but Superior Court justices nevertheless bore the brunt 
of the increase. This naturally contributed to the congestion of the 
11 The average number of days per year of criminal jury sessions from 1949-1950 
through 1952-1953 was 1413. 
4
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civil dockets. The average number of days that Superior Court jus-
tices sat was 175Y2, or 35 five-day weeks. 
Despite legislative authorization for District Court judges to be 
called to sit on motor vehicle tort cases in the Superior Court,12 none 
were in fact called for such service during the year. The authoriza-
tion was temporary only and expires on September 1, 1956, unless 
extended. While the merit of the legislation is open to debate, some 
experimentation with it in the coming year would seem desirable. 
§23.2. The District Courts and the Municipal Court of the City 
of Boston. The statistics of the District Courts, collected by the Ad-
ministrative Committee for the District Courts, continue to show a 
fairly stable volume of business, as the following table reveals: 
TABLE V 
District Court Business 
1954-55 
Civil Writs Entered 
Removals to Superior Court 
Motor Tort Removals 
Criminal Cases Begun 
Small Claims 
63,798 
9,248 
7,756 
202,126 
70,877 
1953-54 
57,102 
3,998 
2,599 
202,334 
73,182 
The increase in civil entries, 6689, corresponds fairly closely to the 
increase in motor tort removals, 5157, attributable to the first year of 
operation under the re-enacted Fielding Act, which requires the en-
try of these cases in the District Court.! 
An interesting innovation is the showing for the first time of the 
number of actual trials of the various types of civil cases in the Dis-
trict Courts. The ratio of trials to entries2 in the current year is rep-
resented by the following percentages: 
Summary Process 44 percent 
Motor Vehicle Tort 18 percent 
Other Tort 15 percent 
Contract 7 percent 
Other 17 percent 
12 Acts of 1954, c. 668. Perhaps unintentionally, this statute also had the effect 
of making temporary the existing authority for District Court judges to sit on mis-
demeanor cases in the Superior Court. Unless there is legislative action before 
September 1, 1956, this useful source of added manpower for the criminal docket 
will no longer be available. 
§23.2. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 616. 
2 The figure representing "entries" for purposes of these percentages is arrived at 
by subtracting from total entries all cases removed to the Superior Court. 
5
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§23.3 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 243 
The over-all percentage is 16 percent. Here is another illustration 
of the truism that the proportion of cases tried is relatively small 
even in a court where a prompt trial can be had if a party so desires. 
The Municipal Court of the City of Boston does not show a signifi-
cantly different picture. 
B. CONGESTION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 
§23.3. The Judicial Survey Commission. Concern over the ever-
increasing congestion in the Superior Court led to the appointment 
by Governor Herter, at the request of the Massachusetts Bar Associa-
tion, of a Commission to consider this problem "as part of a much 
broader study of the entire administration of justice in all of the 
courts of the Commonwealth." 1 Recognizing that the administration 
of justice is not within the exclusive proprietorship of the bench and 
bar, the Governor included on this 21-man Commission civic leaders 
from business, labor, the press, and the clergy. The Commission and 
its several working subcommittees have met frequently, but no report 
was made before the close of the SURVEY year. Indeed, the only public 
pronouncement made by the Commission was a press release endors-
ing four specific recommendations of the Judicial Council then before 
the legislature.2 
The forthcoming report of the Commission, expected early in the 
next legislative year, is likely to have far-reaching effect. The stature 
of its members and the thoroughness of their deliberations assure 
their recommendations of the respectful attention of the public, the 
legislature, and the courts themselves. It may be assumed that a 
major share of the Commission's concern will be for improvement of 
the efficiency of our existing judicial system. Management of the 
courts is big business, and the public should not be forced to put up 
with and foot the bill for a system the extravagance and inefficiency 
of which would not be tolerated in private business. It is to be 
hoped, however, that the Commission will not confine itself to matters 
of judicial housekeeping or even to such of the vital reforms as the 
grant of full rule-making power to the Supreme Judicial Court.3 In-
creased efficiency can speed up the judicial process to a considerable 
degree, but it should be apparent by now that there can be no true 
cure for congestion which does not in some fashion reduce the inflow 
of jury cases which has engulfed the system. 
§23.3. 1 Governor's Inaugural Address, Senate No.1, p. 19 (1955). 
2 The following recommendations of the Judicial Council were specifically en-
dorsed: (I) adoption of a moderate jury fee; (2) provision for oral depositions of 
parties; (3) amendment of G.L., c. 231, §147, concerning authority of the courts to 
prescribe forms of pleading; (4) extension of venue provisions in District Courts. 
None of the recommendations were adopted except the fourth, which was enacted 
in a greatly modified form. See §23.l0 infra. 
31954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §27.15. 
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§23.4. Jury fee. For yearsl the Judicial Council has recommended 
a moderate jury fee as' a means of curtailing the volume of jury 
claims. This year, after the customary rejection of the proposal by 
the legislature, Governor Herter revived it by a special message to the 
legislature urging reconsideration, but it was again rejected despite a 
favorable report from the Judiciary Committee.2 The Judicial Survey 
Commission released a statement to the press8 recommending enact-
ment of the legislation, but this release, which was not accompanied 
by argument in support of it, received scant attention at the time. If 
the Commission remains of the same mind and repeats the recom-
mendation in its report, it may aid in overcoming the traditional 
legislative hostility to jury fees. 
Perhaps, however, a . ent approach might have more chance of 
success. It is m " . e ju claims in small cases which cause con-
cern. The J udici Cou cil as for the last two years collected sta-
tistics on the size ver 'c ,and pointed out last year that in 1953-
1954 the plaintiff re either nothing or less than $500 in more 
than half the cases tri d to a conclusion.4 It is somewhat misleading 
to lump defendant ~ rdicts together with the low verdicts and treat 
them as small case~/in which jury trials should be discouraged. It 
must be apparent ,that verdicts for the defendant often are rendered 
when the damag<1s would be substantial if the plaintiff prevailed. 
Nevertheless, thti Council's point remains sound. Considering only 
/ the 878 plaintiff, verdicts in 1954-1955, the recovery was less than $500 
i in 216, or 24.6 percent of the total, and less than $1000 in 392, or 
)
' 44.6 percent cjf the total. In motor vehicle tort cases, the chief 
'
source of congestion, the percentage of small verdicts was even higher. 
Of the 532 'plaintiff verdicts, 28.2 percent were less than $500 and 
50.4 percent less than $1000. It seems fair to assume, moreover, that 
the likely aIJ:!.ount of the plaintiff's recovery in the cases he lost was 
at least as low as the actual recovery in those he won. Of course, these 
. figures do not fairly reflect the amount involved in jury cases gen-
\
erallY. There are no available records of the amounts paid in settle-
ment of such cases, but trial lawyers will testify that the big cases are 
much more likely to be settled than the small ones. The fact remains 
that the p~lic is paying for jury trials in a very large number of 
cases wherei the amount at stake between the litigants is substantially 
less than t~'e cost of the trial to the taxpayer. Moreover, these cases 
clog the tr' I lists and delay the trial of important cases. 
Pennsyl nia has met the problem of the small jury case head on. 
A recent s tute of that state provides that the courts may adopt a rule 
i 
§23.4. 1 Flub. Doc. 144, Thirtieth Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts 
12 (1955); 2~th Rep. 7 (1954), in which prior proposals of the Council are sum-
marized. 
2 House N 43 (1955). 
a See §2 , . upra, note 2. 
430th ep: lla (1954). 
7
Field: Chapter 23: Administration of Justice
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1955
§23.5 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 245 
requiring arbitration of all civil cases in which less than $1000 is in 
controversy except where the title to real estate is involved.5 The 
members of the bar who are chosen as arbitrators are paid by the 
county in the first instance, but any party dissatisfied with the result 
of the arbitration must, as a condition precedent to a jury trial, reim-
burse the county for the arbitrators' fees. Moreover, these fees are not 
taxed as costs or otherwise recoverable if the party wins before the 
jury. This procedure has been upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania against the challenge that it violated the fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Penn-
sylvania constitutional guarantee of jury trial.6 
The Pennsylvania scheme has had the result in one county in that 
state of keeping 95 percent of these small cases off the jury list and 
thus reducing trial delay for the important cases from between three 
and four years to one year.7 Possibly our Court might take a different 
view of the constitutional question if an adaptation of the Pennsyl-
vania law were enacted here.8 The results in Pennsylvania, however, 
at least suggest the wisdom of thoughtful inquiry into the merits of 
some comparable approach in Massachusetts, though perhaps a less 
drastic one. 
§23.5. A year of the Fielding Act. The first year of operation under 
the re-enacted Fielding Act shows some reduction of motor tort cases 
in the Superior Court, but not enough significantly to affect Superior 
Court congestion. This act, requiring all motor tort cases to be en-
tered in the District Court and then permitting either party to re-
move, became effective on October 1, 1954.1 
In the twelve months preceding that date, there were 14,156 origi-
nal motor tort entries in the Superior Court and 3384 removals, 
giving a total of 17,540 cases in that court. The first year under the 
Fielding Act, ending September 30, 1955, showed 1971 original en-
tries2 and 14,442 removals, a total of 16,413 cases. This is a reduc-
5 Pa. Stats. Ann., tit. 5, §30 (Supp. 1954). 
6 Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858, 76 Sup. Ct. 105, 100 L. Ed. Adv. Sh. 68. 
7 Westwood, The Law's Delay and the Pennsylvania Arbitration Plan, 39 Am. 
Jud. Soc. J. 50, 53 (1955). 
8 The Supreme Judicial Court has upheld the constitutionality of compulsory ref-
erence of motor tort cases to auditors, whose findings are prima facie evidence if 
a jury trial is subsequently claimed. See Fratantonio v. Atlantic Refining Co., 297 
Mass. 21, 8 N.E.2d 168 (1937). The court did not, of course, have occasion to con-
sider the constitutionality of requiring the payment of nonrecoverable costs of the 
first proceeding as a condition precedent to a jury trial. 
§23.5. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 616. 
2 Since G.L., c. 231, §13 permits a mamixum of ninety days between the date of 
the writ and the return day, October, November and December motor vehicle entries 
in the Superior Court were presumably properly returnable to that court. The 
eighty Superior Court entries of such cases after January 1, 1955, appear to be there 
through inadvertence or mistake. The propriety of an amendment allowing transfer 
of such cases to an appropriate District Court should be considered, since otherwise 
8
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tion of 6.4 percent from the previous year. To approach the figures 
from another angle, the total volume of motor vehicle torts entered in 
all courts was 33,228, of which 16,815, or 50.5 percent remained in 
the District Courts, as against 48 percent so remaining in the previous 
year. 
§23.6. Pretrial conference. When the pretrial conference was 
adopted in Suffolk County in 1935,1 following a study of the use of 
this technique in Detroit, it was widely acclaimed as a means of clean-
ing out deadwood from the trial lists, bringing about settlement of 
cases without taking up the time of jury sessions, and, by simplifica-
tion of issues, shortening jury trials. This device has since spread 
widely, and the conventional view of the procedural reformer is to 
accord it unstinted praise.2 There has developed, however, a grow-
ing sense of disenchantment toward pretrial among trial lawyers. It 
is said· that it tends to become perfunctory, that most of the settle-
ments in pretrial sessions would occur in any event before the com-
mencement of trial, and that the notion that trial time is significantly 
shortened by pretrial stipulations is largely a delusion.s The point is 
made that competent counsel will commonly arrive informally at the 
same agreements reached in pretrial sessions under the prodding of the 
court and that there is no effective sanction against the attorney who 
comes to pretrial either unprepared or lacking in authority from his 
client to make concessions, or who is simply uncooperative. 
The truth doubtless lies somewhere in between the extravagant 
statements of those claiming too much for the pretrial device and 
those condemning it as a waste of time. It would appear to have too 
much merit to be lightly abandoned, but attention surely ought to 
be given to means of strengthening it. The court does not lack power 
to require at least that counsel come to pretrial as fully prepared as 
they are when a jury is empaneled.4 Connecticut adopted a rule vir-
they may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter after the 
statute of limitations would bar a new suit. See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §27.6. 
§23.6. 1 Instituted originally in Suffolk County by Judge Gray in 1935, and up-
held in Fanciullo v. B.G. & S. Theatre Corp., 297 Mass. 44, 8 N.E.2d 174 (1937), it 
was established as Superior Court Rule 57A in 1938, and now appears in amended 
form as Superior Court Rule 58 (1954). 
2 See Vanderbilt, The Challenge of Law Reform 63 (1955). 
8 Judge Vanderbilt states, however, that in New Jersey "The cases that do go on 
trial are disposed of in from a third to a half less time than when there was no 
pretrial conference in our state." Note 2 supra at 64. 
4 While this Chapter was in the process of writing, Chief Justice Reardon of the 
Superior Court issued an order designed to improve pretrial procedure. Thl; order 
refers to the power of the court to enter nonsuits or defaults if counsel does not 
attend the pretrial call fully prepared and authorized to act in all matters pertain-
ing to the case. In Fanciullo v. a.G. & S. Theatre Corp., 297 Mass. 44, 8 N.E.2d 174 
(1937), the Supreme Judicial Court in dealing with Judge Gray's order establishing 
the original pretrial call held that promulgation thereof was within the power of 
the judge having charge of the jury list and that action by all the judges was not 
9
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tually identical to Rule 58 of our Superior Court Rules,5 and under 
that rule plaintiffs have been nonsuited for not being prepared at 
pretrial. Such nonsuits have been upheld in Connecticut by the Su-
preme Court of Errors in two cases.6 
These decisions came up procedurally in such a way that the only 
question considered by the court was the bare one of power to order 
a nonsuit for this reason. The court does not discuss the propriety 
of the use of the power in the particular cases, nor do the facts appear 
in the opinion. The writer is informed, however, that one of the 
cases was an action for damages from a fall on an icy sidewalk, and 
that the question of whether the sidewalk surface was or was not 
porous had a bearing on the negligence of the defendant in not pre-
venting the formation of ice. When the plaintiff's attorney stated at 
pretrial that he had not investigated this aspect of the case, the judge 
entered a nonsuit. 
§23.7. Continuances for engagements of counsel. A factor con-
tributing materially to the delay of particular cases, as distinguished 
from the trial list as a whole, is the practice of granting continuances 
when one of the attorneys is actually engaged in the trial of another 
case. The appearance in a case of a busy lawyer who is trying in 
some court almost daily may lead to a succession of postponements 
for this reason, often at a substantial cost in time and money to 
parties and witnesses. This frequently leads to the unseemly specta-
cle of competition among the judges in charge of the trial lists in 
different counties for the attendance of such a lawyer who, when once 
reached for trial in one case, is likely to be ordered to follow himself 
in other cases on the list for that county while his cases in other 
counties stand in abeyance. Possibly a central handling of assign-
ment for the counties with a common active bar, such as Suffolk, 
Middlesex, and Norfolk, would be an improvement, but there is no 
easy solution to the problem. The desire to have trial counsel of 
one's own choosing is entitled to respect, and yet the indefinite delay 
of a trial because of the conflicting engagements of a busy lawyer 
seems unfair. 
It is clear that the matter is one of policy rather than power. The 
Supreme Judicial Court said in 1925, in a case dealing with the denial 
of a continuance in a capital case because of defendant counsel's 
engagement elsewhere: 
essential to its validity. Chief Justice Reardon also served notice upon the bar of 
the intention to take action with respect to continuances for engagements of counsel. 
discussed in §23.7 intra, and requested cooperation from the bar in arriving at a fair 
solution of the problem. 
5 The Connecticut rule. like the Massachusetts rule. provided for a call of the 
pretrial list. "at which call continuances. non-suits. or defaults may be entered." 
Rules of Trial Court §144. Conn. Practice Book (1951). 
6 Stanley v. Hartford. 140 Conn. 643. 103 A.2d 147 (1954); O'Brien v. Rome, 140 
Conn. 649. 103 A.2d 150 (1954). 
10
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There is no dearth of lawyers. There is congestion in the dockets 
of the Superior Court. No attorney can accept personal retainers 
for a larger number of cases than he can try as and when they 
are reached and expect courts to continue any case for his con-
venience or that of his clients. Unreasonable delay in the admin-
istration of justice can be avoided only by leaving continuances 
of cases because of conflicting engagements of counsel solely to 
the sound discretion of the court.1 
This problem has been dealt with in Cook County, Illinois, where 
the Superior Court jury docket is one of the most congested in the 
United States. All motions for continuances in that county are heard 
by the assignment judge, and his denial of a continuance because of 
counsel's engagement was upheld recently by the Appellate Court of 
Illinois in an opinion describing at length conditions in the courts of 
Cook County strikingly parallel to those prevailing in Massachusetts. 
The court said, "There is no constitutional, statutory or other provi-
sion which gives a party the right to choose a particular lawyer, with-
out regard to whether that lawyer has the time to try the case or not. 
Such a doctrine would have results that would be disastrous." 2 
C. THE YEAR'S LEGISLATION 
§23.8. Judicial salaries. There was a paucity of significant legis-
lation in 1955 bearing upon the administration of justice. There 
was a merited increase in the salaries of justices of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court and the Superior Court and of the judges of the Land 
Court and the Probate Courts.1 An associate justice of the Supreme 
Judicial Court now receives a salary of $22,000, as compared to 
$18,500 in 1951, $17,000 in 1946, and $14,000 before the war.2 The 
other increases have been roughly comparable. It is worth noting, 
however, that these increases have fallen well short of the increase 
in the cost of livingS and that our judges are still less well treated 
financially than they were a quarter-century ago.4 
The salaries of the chief justice and associate justices of the 
Municipal Court of the City of Boston were also increased to $16,000 
and $15,000 respectively, an increase of $3000, and for the first time 
§23.7. 1 Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275. 277. 146 N.E. 700, 701 (1925). 
2 Gray v. Gray, 128 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ill. App. 1955). 
§23.8. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 733. 
2 Acts of 1951, c. 742. §1; Acts of 1946, c. 544, §l. Prior to the 1946 increase, these 
justices had received $14,000 since 1928. Acts of 1928. c. 295. §l. 
S The Consumer Price Index of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows an in-
crease in the cost of living in Boston of 84.3 percent between the base period 1935-
1939 and October, 1955. 
4 In 1939, Congress removed the exemption of state officers and employees from 
federal income tax. Pub. L. No. 32, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. §1 (April 12, 1939). amend-
ing §22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 
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these justices were required to devote full time to their duties and were 
forbidden to engage in the practice of law.1I Justices of the full-time 
District Courts have been barred from the practice of law since 1948,6 
but until this year the justices of the Municipal Court of the City 
of Boston, although their judicial service was substantially full time 
in fact, were free to practice law. It was this difference in their 
status, eliminated by this legislation, which was in past years one of 
the stumbling blocks to District Court reorganization.7 There was also 
a minor increase in the jurisdiction of this court, which was empow-
ered to review certain decisions of the Civil Service Commissions and 
to hear appeals from decisions of the board of appeal on motor 
vehicle policies and bonds.9 
In addition, the salaries of District Court judges in six full-time 
courts were increased from $9900 to $12,000,10 and there was a gen-
eral increase in the salaries of the District Court judges in the part-
time courts ranging from $300 to $900, the higher raises going to those 
judges whose prior salaries were in the lower brackets.11 Since the 
salaries of the clerks and assistant clerks of the District Courts are fixed 
as a percentage of the judge's salary, they were automatically simi-
larly raised by this legislation, a result which evoked some criticism 
in the press.12 
The legislature continued to follow the pattern of making its own 
members ultimately eligible for salary increases voted during their 
terms as legislators for judicial positions to which they were ap-
pointed. The Constitution forbids a legislator from being appointed 
during his term to an office the emoluments of which are increased 
during such term.1S The practice has developed when salary increases 
are voted to make them inapplicable to persons appointed thereafter, 
thus opening the door to the appointment of legislators. The suc-
ceeding legislature then corrects the disparity.14 This "double play" 
technique, while it may seem a circumvention of the constitutional 
mandate, removes a political impediment to deserved increases in 
judicial salaries and gives the Governor an opportunity to consider a 
lawyer-legislator for judicial appointment. 
§23.9. Compensation of jurors. The legislature also increased the 
compensation of jurors in first degree murder cases from $10 to $12 
per day and all other jurors from $8 to $10 per day.1 This is the 
1\ Acts of 1955, c. 748. 
6 Acts of 1948, c. 656. 
71954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §27.l1. 
S Acts of 1955, c. 407. 
9 Id., c. 412. 
10 Id., c. 334. 
11 Id., c. 741. 
12 The Boston Herald, Sept. 16, 1955, p. 32. 
13 Mass. Const., Articles of Amendment, Art. LXV. 
14 See, e.g., Acts of 1955, c. 475. 
§23.9. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 328. 
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second such increase since World War 11,2 and it makes the compensa-
tion as great as in any state in the country and much greater than in 
most.S While it adds appreciably to the already heavy cost of running 
the courts, the legislation offers some hope for improving the quality 
of jurors and reducing the incentive to seek excuse from jury duty. 
§23.10. Venue in District Courts. The Judicial Council has for 
four years1 recommended that plaintiffs in all actions of tort or con-
tract be given the same choice of districts that is available in motor 
vehicle tort cases: namely, the district where the plaintiff lives, the 
district where the defendant lives, or a district adjoining and in the 
same county as the district where the defendant lives or has his usual 
place of business.2 A variant of this proposal which passed the House 
in 1954 but was rejected in the Senate was approved by the Judicial 
Council as a satisfactory alternative to its own proposal.s The legisla-
ture left the general venue provision untouched but made a minor 
modification applicable only to motor vehicle torts,4 which added to 
the choice of districts one in which a party has a usual place of busi-
ness. The controversy over these piecemeal proposals and an ex-
amination of the present statutes point up the wisdom of a fresh ap-
proach to the whole venue problem. Ii Venue provisions ought to be 
designed with a view to trial convenience and fairness to the parties, 
a purpose which has been obscured in the present jerry-built structure 
of amendment on amendment. Might it not be wise, for instance, to 
consider making the district where the events giving rise to the ac-
tion occurred a proper district for venue purposes? 
§23.11. Speedy trial of removed cases. The legislature enacted a 
statute making mandatory the grant of a motion for speedy trial in a 
case removed from the District Court by the defendant where the ad 
damnum is not more than $2000.1 This measure was endorsed by 
the Judicial Council,2 and is a desirable deterrent to removal for pur-
poses of delay. It overlaps to some degree the provision of the Field-
ing Act that a removed motor vehicle tort case "may" be advanced on 
motion, regardless of which party removed the case and of the amount 
2 Acts of 1949, c. 335; Acts of 1945, c. 236, §1. 
S Only Delaware, some counties in Maine, and Rhode Island pay their jurors as 
well as Massachusetts. The daily stipend falls as low as $1 in Louisiana, $1.50 in 
New Mexico. A daily stipend of between $3 and $6 is common. Institute of Judi-
cial Administration, Jury Costs (1955). 
§23.l0. 1 Pub. Doc. 144, Twenty-seventh Report of the Judicial Council of Massa-
chusetts 34 (1951); 28th Rep. 21 (1952); 29th Rep. 11 (1953); 30th Rep. 17 (1953). 
2 C.L., c. 223, §2. 
S House No. 2755 (1954). 
4 Acts of 1955, c. 158. 
Ii See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 307 
(1951). 
§23.l1. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 359. 
2 Pub. Doc. 144, Thirtieth Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts 30 
(1955). 
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involved. In this permissive form, the latter provision is merely de-
claratory of the inherent power of the court to determine the order of 
its business. Fortunately, the court has shown little disposition to act 
under this broad provision. Were it to do so, it would simply be dis-
criminating against contract actions and other types of tort actions. 
In the first nine months of 1955, over 57 percent of the cases entered 
in or removed to the Superior Court were motor vehicle tort actions. 
Obviously no such portion of the total volume should be entitled to 
special consideration for advancement for speedy trial. The existence 
of such a provision emphasizes the need of a reappraisal of the statu-
tory grounds for speedy trial.3 
§23.12. Summary judgment in contract cases. Another Judicial 
Council proposal which became law was a statute providing for sum-
mary judgment in contract actions where it is shown that no genuine 
issue of material facts exists, but only questions of law.! This act is 
more guardedly drawn than Federal Rule 56, which applies to all 
types of cases, but it should cover the majority of cases where the 
dispute can be isolated to questions of law. Clearly the device has no 
usefulness in the typical tort case, but after a body of experience has 
developed under the present limited statute it may be worth while to 
consider broadening it to cover the admittedly rare situation where a 
tort claim stands or falls upon a clear question of law. 
§23.13. Other legislative proposals. As usual a large number of 
bills dealing with the administration of justice were filed and failed of 
passage. Once more the meritorious Judicial Council proposal for 
the deposition of parties was shelved despite a favorable committee 
report.1 Once more reorganization of the District Courts came to 
naught, although a halfway measure toward that end came close to 
passage.2 The suggestion of Governor Herter, who has consistently 
favored reorganization, that the legislature await the report of the 
Judicial Survey Commission was finally followed. Proposals for six-
man juries in the District Courts3 and the Municipal Court of the City 
of Boston,4 and for limited service for Superior Court justices over 
seventy years old with the appointment of full-time justices to replace 
them,5 attracted considerable support but not enough for passage. 
The legislative ferment over the several proposals aimed to relieve 
congestion furnishes a sound basis of hope for favorable action upon 
such recommendations as the Judicial Survey Commission may make. 
31954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §27.2. 
§23.12. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 674. 
§23.l3. 1 House No. 2751 (1955). 
2 Senate No. 732 (1955). 
3 House No. 842 (1955). 
4 House No. 2831 (1955). 
5 Senate No. 312 (1955). 
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